By virtue of this representation of infinity, Ockham also states that two sets with infinite parts are not necessarily equal, but one of the two can be greater than the other, (. The article analyses the concept of actual infinity in William of Ockham’s thought, thanks to a close reading of his writings, first those on physics, where he argues more than once the existence of the actual infinity, intended as a set of infinite parts in act present in a continuum. Thus, from this systematic feature, the accidentally quantified reading is more reasonable. Nevertheless, examining Zabarella’s writing on the topic as a whole, the trajectory of his overall argument is remarkably sympathetic to Averroes, who famously took the accidentally quantified position. I argue that a decisive reading based solely upon any particular texts is not available. However, there are two other texts apparently stating that matter is extended in virtue of a distinct accident in the category of quantity. There is an important text where he apparently suggests that prime matter is extended in and of itself. However, it is less clear how he accounts for its extension. ) rebus naturalibus, Zabarella defends the position that prime matter is extended. The late scholastic Jacobus Zabarella (1533-1589) arrived upon his views about prime matter via his version of the regressus method, a program for a sort of scientific reasoning. One much-debated topic in the course of this shift was regarding prime matter. The 16th and 17th centuries witnessed a philosophical shift that would help pave the way for modern science, a shift from metaphysical theories of material objects to other views embracing only the empirically-accessible parts of material things. We can explain the singular cognition of an extramental singular simply by making the cognition of its species and the sensory intuitive cognition of it interact with each other. Chatton’s conclusion is that since we can never experience an act of intellective intuitive cognition in itself, it is superfluous to posit this act of cognition.
We cannot intuitively and intellectively cognize a thing without recognizing that thing as a thing of a certain kind.
) intuitive cognition of a singular thing from the cognition of the species of that thing. Second, he argues that we cannot separate the intellective (. The former always arises with the latter, and whatever we can explain through the former, we can explain equally well through the latter. First, he raises doubts about the possibility of distinguishing intellective intuitive cognition from sensory intuitive cognition. Chatton has two main arguments for his point. On many occasions, Walter Chatton argues that this kind of cognition is unnecessary. Intellective intuitive cognition plays a key role in William of Ockham’s philosophy.
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